to Greece under conditionality, which was described in the Memoranda of Understanding attached to the letters of intent that Greece has addressed to its respective lenders in 2010 2 and 2012. 3 The term "Memorandum of Understanding" became a synonym to austerity and to personal distress for the Greek people being affected by the crisis. 4 Since the beginning of the crisis, the fear of the consequences of the financial catastrophe for which the Greeks were not prepared and the stigma linked to receiving assistance under conditionality made the political debate and almost all of the political personnel of the Greek Parliament sceptical about the efficiency of the measures included in the Memorandum of Understanding. 5 As a result, the implementation of the measures of the Memoranda of Understanding is never without any hindrance in Greece. Some of the Greek political elite continue to be hostile to the Memoranda of Understanding and declare that they will not accept them. 6 While this article is under publication, the declarations of the new elected government of Greece concerning its refusal to pursue the requirements of the Memoranda of Understanding 7 could not make the subject of our analysis more accurate. It is thereby necessary to examine the legal nature of the IMF Memoranda of Understanding and the Memoranda of Understanding with the European creditors assumed by Greece and whether they are legally binding. The outcome of this analysis is important not only for the continuation of the attribution of the financial assistance to Greece in the active phase of the Memoranda of Understanding 8 but also -that remains to be seen -for the execution in the repayment phase at the end of the term of the financial assistance to Greece. This analysis will make clear whether Greece could declare unilaterally not to fulfil any more the conditions and could free itself of its obligations resulting from the financial assistance provided, particularly whether and to which extent Greece will still be obliged by the conditions of the repayment of the European and the international assistance. Moreover, the results of the article may also be productive in future cases, if other member states would receive financial assistance under conditionality.
The present article neither specifies the mechanisms of assistance 9 devised by the European Union (EU) and the member states in order to avoid future economic crisis nor does it enter in the discussion of their legality under the EU law. 10 It is not dealing with the suitability or the actual effectiveness of the measures applied to fight the crisis. Moreover, the deficiencies of Greece 11 as well as the questions about the measures to forecast and to avert 12 destabilizing situations for a member state of the eurozone are outside the scope of the investigation of the present article. Our analysis however will not be limited to the sphere of the rules of the (national) Greek legal order. 13 Since the Memoranda of Understanding contain the conditions of the European/IMF financial assistance, they are governed by the rules of the international and the European legal order. 9 The response of the European Union and of the member states to the sovereign debt crisis was the creation of instruments of assistance, i. the national legal order, the Memoranda of Understanding represent primarily an international aspect whose importance was rightly underlined by the Greek Council of State (668/2012) where the laws that were adopted for the implementation of the Memoranda of Understanding, were challenged.
II. The first set of Memoranda of Understanding
In early 2010 Greece was facing one of the most 14 devastating financial situations of its modern history. The then newly elected Greek government announced an upward revision of the public deficit of Greece to an alarming 12.7 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 15 and of its debt level to 299 billion Euro or 129.3 % of GDP 16 which practically deprived Greece from the private capital market and led it to ask for international financial assistance in order to cover its financial needs. Being a member state of the EU and the eurozone, it was evident that at the distress time in 2010 Greece would ask for financial assistance from the family of the Euro Area Member States (EAMS). Since the EU did not have the framework nor the technique for the resolution of such situations, it started with the possibility of contributing coordinated bilateral loans by other member states and also financial assistance by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to Greece as part of a package involving "substantial IMF financing and a majority of European financing" 17 which would be "subject to strong conditionality". 18 1. On 3 May 2010 19 the Greek Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Greece (who were legally authorized under the Greek law 3845/2010) addressed a letter of intent to the President of the Eurogroup, to the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro of the European Commission and to the President of the European Central Bank requesting for financial assistance from the EAMS for a total amount of 80 billion Euro. To this letter of intent which was signed in three originals, in the English language, by the European Commission, acting on behalf of the EAMS, and the Hellenic Republic, was attached a Memorandum of Understanding, consisting of three parts: a Memorandum of Understanding of economic and financial policies (MEFP), a Memorandum of Understanding on specific economic policy conditionality (MoU) and a Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). 20 The letter of intent as well as the three-part Memorandum of Understanding 14 Sovereign debt defaults are not unknown to the modern history of Greece, c.f. Kostis, The spoiled children of history: on the formation and evolution of the state in Greece, 18th-21st century, 2013. constituted the conditionality of the Loan facility Agreement provided to Greece in the form of a pooling of 80 billion bilateral loans 21 by the EAMS on 8 May 2010.
2. On 3 May 2010 the Greek Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Greece additionally addressed a letter of intent to which was attached a MEFP and a TMU to the General Director of the IMF asking for extra financial assistance under the form of a Stand-By Arrangement of 30 billion Euro. 22 The letter of intent and the MEFP and the TMU described the conditionality supported by the financial assistance of the requested arrangement. The MoU (as well as the letter of intent) that Greece has addressed to the European addressees was also submitted to the IMF. 23 On 9 May 2010 the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a three-year SDR 26.4 billion (30 billion Euro) Stand-By Arrangement for Greece. 24 The anticipated goals of the above Economic Adjustment Programme (with the EAMS and the IMF) having not been realized, 25 -in 2010 the public debt of Greece has already mounted to 329 billion Euro or 144.9 % of GDP and at the end of 2011 the figures recorded a further worsening to 368 billion Euro or 169 % of GDP 26 -it has then 27 been decided that the restructuring of the Greek debt was urgent in order to restore a structural balance and to build the foundation for the debt-to-GDP ratio to decline back to sustainable levels.
Therefore in early 2012, Greece had succeeded in restructuring her debt by the conclusion of a Private Sector Involvement (PSI) exchange offer (a so-called "haircut"). The PSI arrangement was based on a common Understanding, between Greece and the Steering Committee of the Private Creditor-Investor Committee for Greece (which represented Allianz, Alpha Bank, Axa, BNP Paribas, CNP Assurances, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, EFG Eurobank Ergasias, Greylock Capital Management, ING, Intesa San Paolo, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, National Bank of Greece) 28 on the terms and conditions of a debt exchange package on 21 February 2012. The PSI agreement included an offer for a reduction of the nominal value of the Greek bonds as well as an exchange of the existing Greek bonds into new ones, i.e. new Greek government bonds and GDP-linked securities issued in exchange for privately held Greek government bonds. By that, Greece converted high rate bonds with short maturity to low rate bonds with long maturity as well as introduced a direct 53.5 % haircut to the nominal value of the privately held sovereign debt. 29 Furthermore, the new bonds are covered by English law, giving the creditors more security against a future attempt of another haircut for private creditors.
The success of the above Private Sector Involvement operation, which finally reached 83.5 % of Greek bond holders (172 billion Euro out of the total 206 billion Euro PSI eligible bonds), 30 was one of the sine qua non conditions 31 for the granting of new financial assistance to Greece by the conclusion of the Second Economic Adjustment Programme, which is the successor to the (first) Economic Adjustment Programme. In March 2012 Greece was, indeed, requesting additional financing assistance to the European Financial Stabilization Facility (EFSF) 32 and to the IMF in order to attain the sustainability of its debt. The new financial assistance was provided under conditionality laid down in a new set of Memoranda of Understanding. 29 The main features of the PSI operation were the following: for each eligible privately held Greek government bond 53.5 % of the principal amount was forgiven, 31.5 % of the principal amount was exchanged into 20 new Greek government bonds with maturities of 11 to 30 years replicating an amortization of 5 % per annum commencing in 2023, and the remaining 15 % was in short-dated securities issued by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The coupon on the new Greek government bonds was structured so that it was 2 % for the three year period from 
III. The second set of Memoranda of Understanding
The second international financial assistance is based on the commitment of the Eurozone member states and the IMF to the disbursement of the undisbursed amounts of the first financial assistance to Greece 33 plus additional 130 billion Euro. 34 The duration of the European financial assistance which ended at the end of 2014 and has been extended till the end of February 2015, 35 can be extended additionally till 2016, 36 if, for instance, Greece would not have implemented the totality of the conditionality of the Programme 37 by the end of February 2015. For being granted the new financial assistance from the EAMS, on 11 March 2012, Greece submitted a letter of intent and new MEFP, MoU and TMU setting the economic policy conditionality. 38 On 14 March 2012 the euro area finance ministers approved financing of the Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece under conditionality. 39 The Second European financial assistance amounts to 109.1 billion Euro 40 granted by the EFSF.
Additionally, on 9 March 2012 Greece has requested the cancellation of the existing Stand-By Arrangement of 2010 and a four-year arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) of 28 billion Euro by addressing to the IMF a letter of intent, a MEFP and a TMU in which were described the conditionality of the new financing of the IMF. 41 The letter of intent and the MoU that were addressed to the European organs by Greece were additionally included to the documents addressed to the IMF. 42 On 15 
B. The function of the Memoranda of Understanding of Greece
The conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding containing the conditionality of the financial assistance is traditionally determining the assistance of IMF. 44 Established in 1944 the IMF is not only a bank, which is providing credit to member countries with deficits and debts (Article I(v) of the Articles of the IMF Agreement), but the central institution of consultation and cooperation of the international financial system. 45 For being entitled to use the General Resources of the IMF, a member of the IMF should purchase the currencies of other members from the Fund in exchange for an equivalent amount of its own currency up to the limit of its first credit tranche 46 (Article V(3)(b) of the Articles of Agreement). 47 The use of resources of the upper credit tranches, 48 via Stand-By Arrangements, Extended Facilities and other facilities proposed to highly indebted member countries, are available to the members of the IMF only under conditionality 49 (Article V(3) of the Articles of Agreement). For an Extended Facility arrangement a member country should explain the reasons that make necessary the financial assistance of the IMF and present: (ii) a detailed statement of the policies and measures for the first 12 months constituting an initiation of the program referred to in (i) considered substantial in the member's circumstances, with the understanding that, for each subsequent 12-month period, the member will present to the Fund a detailed statement of the progress made, and the policies and measures as in (ii) that will be followed, to further the realization of the objectives of the program referred to in (i) with such modifications in the member's policies as might reasonably be considered necessary to assist it to achieve its objectives in changing circumstances.
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After that, the IMF reviews the application of the member and decides whether the assistance is required to address its problems in a manner consistent with the Articles of Agreement.
In the beginning of 2010 the EU did not have a particular procedure analogous to the above mentioned one applied for giving a member country of IMF access to the financial assistance of the Fund. The modalities of the international financial assistance to Greece involving EAMS as well as IMF financing have been described in the Council Decision 2010/320/EU of 10 May 2010. 51 It detailed 52 that the disbursement of the European financial assistance would be decided by the EAMS by unanimity, subject to strong conditionality, and based on an assessment by the European Commission and the European Central Bank. It is worth noting that in spite of the difference of the provenance (i.e. EAMS and IMF) of the financial assistance to Greece, the conditions of financing that Greece had to fulfil had been coordinated.
The discussions about the conditionality of the financial assistance to Greece were conducted on a quadrilateral basis between the Greek authorities and the representatives of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF resulting in a set of macroeconomic and structural policy parameters. These were set out in the three-fold Memoranda of Understanding (i.e. the MEFP, the MoU and the TMU) undertaken by Greece for obtaining the international financial assistance provided by the EAMS/ EFSF and the IMF. Within this framework, as was already described above, Greece has respectively submitted to the European authorities and the IMF a letter of intent and the above mentioned Memoranda of Understanding laying down the conditionality of the financing.
The MEFP focuses on macroeconomic policies and selected structural measures and comprises the supporting policies that Greece should implement during 
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ZEuS 1/2015 11 covers the full structural reform agenda agreed between Greece and the European Commission 54 specifying detailed economic policy measures that serve as benchmarks for assessing policy performance in the context of the quarterly reviews under the financial assistance Programmes. 55 The TMU finally formulates the definitions of the indicators subject to quantitative targets (performance criteria and indicative targets) specified in the letter of intent as well the methods for the assessment of the Programme performance and the information requirements to ensure adequate monitoring of the targets. 56 The implementation of the conditionality of the Memoranda of Understanding with the EAMS/EFSF and the IMF leading consecutively to the fulfillment of goals of the two Economic Adjustment Programmes for Greece, is monitored during the duration of the respective Programmes by quarterly reviews led by a tripartite body, the troika, composed by a representative of the European Commission, one of the ECB and one of the IMF. 57 The assessment of the progress in implementing the policies of the two Economic Adjustment Programmes with respectively the EAMS/EFSF and the IMF does not exclude to reach understandings on any additional measures that may be needed to achieve their objectives. 58 In that respect, the first Economic Adjustment Programme of Greece with the EAMS as well as the Programme of Greece under the Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF have been updated five times 59 according to the development of the economy and of the debt of Greece. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme of Greece with EFSF as well as the Adjustment Program of Greece under the EFF with the IMF have been, till the end of 2014, updated four times. 60 The release of the disbursements of the financial assistance to Greece is based on observance of quantitative performance criteria and a positive evaluation of progress made with respect to policy criteria, detailed in the each time revised Memorandum of Understanding. 61 The international financial assistance disbursed till end of August 63 Given the magnitude of the funds that were mobilized for Greece, one would have expected that the financial assistance would have been welcome to the beneficiary state. In fact, since the crisis was felt as a national and personal catastrophe, the discussions about the reasons of the crisis and the decisions for the adoption of both the sets of the Memoranda of Understanding gave place to turbulent reactions in Greece. The austerity plans which signals the implementation of the conditionality of the Memoranda of Understanding as well as the domestic feeling of a lack of ownership of the Memoranda of Understanding 64 rendered the two Economic Adjustment Programmes very unpopular in Greece. A series of demonstrations and general strikes broke out after the announcement of their conclusion as well as each time that it was question for adoption of new austerity measures after almost each review of the Economic Adjustment Programmes. 65 The Memoranda of Understanding became -and still are -a tool of antagonism between the political parties in Greece. This is due to the fact that the political forces have basically been concentrated on the implications of the adoption of the Memoranda of Understanding seen mostly through the optic of the national sovereignty. 66 It is worth noting that the question concerning the compatibility of the first Memorandum of Understanding with the Greek Constitution was raised before the Greek Supreme Administrative Court. In fact, the case that was brought in front of the Greek Council of State was about a petition made by a number of legal and natural persons 67 for annulment of acts of the administrative authorities issued upon authorization of the Greek law 3845/2010 68 which introduced the first Memoranda of Understanding and the first Economic Adjustment Programme 69 in the national legal order. The petition for the annulment was inter alia based on the grounds of the unconstitutionality of the above mentioned Greek statute. Without making any difference between the two (of the first set of) Memoranda of Understanding, i.e. the one that Greece has assumed with the European creditors and the other with the IMF in The Athens Bar Association, the Union of Public sector employees, the Union of the journalists, to name some. 68 The actions that were foreseen in the Memoranda of Understanding of Greece were implemented by the adoption of laws mostly by the Greek Parliament. The extraordinary social uneasiness that was provoked at the times of the parliamentary debates for the vote of laws enacting the measures foreseen by the Memoranda of Understanding gave place to the adoption of legal acts under the form of Presidential decrees according to Article 44 para. 1 of the Hellenic Constitution: "Under extraordinary circumstances of an urgent and unforeseeable need, the President of the Republic may, upon the proposal of the Cabinet, issue acts of legislative content. Such acts shall be submitted to Parliament for ratification, as specified in the provisions of article 72 para. 1, within forty days of their issuance or within forty days from the convocation of a parliamentary session. Should such acts not be submitted to Parliament within the above time-limits or if they should not be ratified by Parliament within three months of their submission, they will henceforth cease to be in force". 69 The Greek law 3845/2010 has furthermore introduced the first international assistance of Greece in the national legal order and gave the powers to the Greek Minister of Finance as well as to the Governor of the Bank of Greece to conclude the acts that are comprised to the Economic Adjustment Programme. It is remarkable that what is coming out of the above mentioned ruling of the Council of State is that the question of the constitutionality of the Memoranda of Understanding as well as of the Greek statutes that were adopted for the implementation of the measures that were described in the Memoranda of Understanding, was intertwined with the legal nature of the Memoranda of Understanding.
C. Is there any binding force in the Memoranda of Understanding of Greece? I. Two sets of Memoranda of Understanding − Two regimes
The source of the financial assistance to Greece being not unique, Greece has formally assumed in 2010 as well as in 2012 two sets of Memoranda of Understanding − one with the EAMS/EFSF on one side, and on the other side with the IMF. Nevertheless, irrespective of the source of the financial assistance the conditionality contained in each of the above mentioned sets of Memoranda of Understanding is basically in substance not distinct from the other, although the conditionality laid down in the MoU 
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ZEuS 1/2015 15 of the (European) Economic Adjustment Programme is more detailed. 74 The language as well as the goals 75 of each of the MEFP/MTU with the IFM and MEFP/MoU with the European lenders are identical. It could evidently not be else since the content of all the sets of Memoranda of Understanding, also as they are each time updated, consist of a set of macroeconomic and structural policy parameters agreed between the same parties, i.e. the Greek authorities and the troika members. 76 From the similarity of the form and the content of the Memoranda of Understanding, we nevertheless cannot conclude that the legal nature, as well as the legally binding force of the Memoranda of Understanding with EAMS/EFSF and with the IMF is identical. As we will analyse the creditors of Greece do not have the same concept: the EAMS/EFSF want the conditionality of the Memoranda of Understanding having legally binding force and the IMF not. There is no formal definition of the content of the term "Memorandum of Understanding" in international law. It may be understood as a treaty or it may only refer to a "gentlemen's agreement" with no legally binding force. 77 In order to establish its nature, however, reference must be made to the intention of the parties, its content and the provision for penalties in the event of non-compliance. A positive sign that parties are opining that their Memorandum of Understanding is binding is that it is submitted to the ratification procedure under national law as required for the conclusion of public international law treaties by the national constitutions. But neither of the Memoranda of Understanding for the European or international financial assistance to Greece were submitted to the Greek Parliament for approval and ratification. 78 On the other hand a clearly negative sign concerning a legally binding nature would be if at least one of the parties would openly and clearly reject it. It will have to be shown that in this respect the practice of the IMF and of the EU are completely different. 
II. The nature of the Memoranda of Understanding of Greece with IMF
The IMF is a lender of last resort for sovereign states. Although in its Articles of Agreement the legal form of the financial assistance of the IMF is not defined, the IMF has developed various loan instruments that are tailored to address the specific circumstances of its diverse membership (Article V(3)(a) of the IMF Articles of Agreement). 79 According to Article V(2)(b) of the Articles of Agreement, the IMF is not providing financial assistance in the form of an ordinary loan to its members. The IMF resources are usually made available under a lending "arrangement". 80 The bulk of non-concessional IMF assistance is provided through Stand-By Arrangements. 81 As it has above been analyzed the first IMF financial assistance to Greece was under the form of a Stand-By Arrangement and the second under the form of an Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Stand-By Arrangements appeared for the first time in 1952. 82 The Stand-By Arrangement is "a decision of the Fund by which a member is assured that it will be able to make purchases from the General Resources Account in accordance with the terms of the decision during a specified period and up to a specified amount", 83 which is governed by the principle of conditionality. 84 The financial assistance under this form is given to a member of the IMF when it has committed itself to the implementation of an Economic Adjustment Programme, 85 which ensures that the country in question will overcome problems that led it to seek financial aid from the international community and restitute the economic equilibrium.
In contrast to a Stand-By Arrangement which supports a short-term (12 to 36 months at the most) relief 86 and repayment period of three and a quarter to five years, the EFF, established in 1974, gives medium-term (three to four years) assistance to a country in strong need of structural reform which needs time to implement, and features longer period of repayment (4 and a half to 10 years). 87 The EFF is also provided under conditionality.
The conditionality is described in the Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) that may be accompanied by a Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). 88 The principles and rules of the conditionality are described in the 2002 Guidelines on Conditionality 89 as they are modified by the 2009 Operational Guidance to Staff: GRA Lending Toolkit and Conditionality: Reform Proposals. 90 It is worth noting that according to Section A3 of the 2002 Guidelines of Conditionality "national ownership of sound economic and financial policies and an adequate administrative capacity are crucial for successful implementation of Fund-supported programs. In responding to members' requests to use Fund resources and in setting program-related conditions, the Fund will be guided by the principle that the member has primary responsibility for the selection, design, and implementation of its economic and financial policies. The Fund will encourage members to seek to broaden and deepen the base of support for sound policies in order to enhance the likelihood of successful implementation".
In this context, the conditionality defines the targets that are economically attainable, but the ownership -the concretization -of the measures as well as what is not feasible lies with the member, which will take part in the elaboration of the Memorandum of Understanding. That being so, and as far as the conditionality is for securing the repayment of the financing and improves the financial situation of the recipient, the member asking for the IMF financial assistance and having no other less burdensome alternative than to accept the financing under the often hard measures of the letter of intent or Memorandum of Understanding, does not act under coercion, in the meaning of Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 91 Although it is difficult in the modern international world to draw a line between permitted economic pressure and prohibited intervention, because the states are economically linked with each other in such a way that almost every economic act of a state affects other states and may thereby put them under pressure, it has to be admitted that states are free to decide which other states they want to give economic support to. 92 When such an obligation does not exist, the granting of financial assistance under conditionality which may be not welcome to the borrower, should not be considered, especially in the case of the IMF, a breach of the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of the state borrower, 93 since as a banking institution it should take care of its creditworthiness and therefore has to secure that financial helps will be repaid to it. The arrangements of the IMF do not constitute international agreements, since "language having a contractual connotation will be avoided in arrangements and in program documents". 94 In the light of this language, the lack of intention of IMF to contract 95 excludes the contractual form of IMF arrangements. 96 The IMF does not want to have a legal contract with a member and be legally bound, in order to be able to set the conditions of an arrangement and to determine whether these conditions are met. 97 The Stand-by Arrangement is 98 a unilateral decision of the Fund's Executive Board which sets the conditions of the financial assistance, and the Extended Arrangements are basically 99 subject to the Fund's decisions and policies on Stand-by Arrangements.
Hence, the Memoranda of Understanding, which are the documents setting the policies and the conditions of an IMF supporting program, do not have any legally binding force. The IMF recognizes that it seeks "to avoid subjecting a country member to contractual obligations to implement their programs and putting the country member in the unenviable position of being in breach of a legal obligation if it failed to meet a condition. To provide incentives to members, IMF seeks to minimize the legal consequences attached to failure. A member is free to walk away from its program and the arrangement at any time". 100 In this context, when a member assumes to respect the conditionality, the IMF unilaterally asserts the disbursement of the amount of the financial assistance. A member receiving financial assistance from the IMF remains free to decide for the continuation of the implementation of the conditionality and eventually to assume the conse-quences for declaring it impossible and opting out of getting more financing. 101 However, it is worth noting that if a member fails to fulfil any of its obligations under the Arrangement, it risks losing important rights from its membership to the IMF, namely by being declared ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund. 102 Being it so for the Memoranda of Understanding assumed by Greece in the context of the Stand-By Arrangement in 2010 and the EFF in 2012 with the IMF, is this analysis also valid for the Memoranda of Understanding of Greece with the EAMS/EFSF? In case of a positive answer, is it conceivable that Greece could decide not to comply with the conditionality of the EAMS/EFSF financing? Should the rules of breach of a contract be predominant to this analysis or should the special aims of the Memoranda of Understanding accompanying the financial assistance of the EAMS/EFSF be taken into consideration?
III. The nature of the Memoranda of Understanding of Greece with the EAMS/EFSF
Before the serious financial crisis in 2008-2009, the EU had not faced the need to provide financial assistance to any of its member states on the grounds of their budgetary position and their government debt. Besides, the "no bailout-principle" of Article 125 TFEU 103 precludes the sharing of liability for government debt across member states. The financial crisis of 2009 has magnified the problems of the unfinished construction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Not having any institutional means for providing financial assistance to an EAMS fighting against the dangers threatening the financial stability of the eurozone, 104 the EU has devised a procedure from scratch 105 for granting financial and stability support to an EAMS.
Concerning Greece, 106 the Union decided to provide the necessary first financial aid 107 by means of bilateral agreements and the second financial aid by the EFSF. The European financial support to Greece has been finalized in the Decision of the Council 2010/320/EU, adopted on 10 May 2010. 108 After each one of the periodical reviews of the implementation of the measures 109 required by the Decision and for rendering the conditionality more flexible, the Decision was revised 110 and in the interest of clarity finally recast by the Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011. 111 All the above mentioned Council Decisions are based on Articles 126(9) and 136 TFEU. Article 126(9) TFEU defines the measures of coercion of the Council against member states which have not been successful in adopting sound measures in order to regain their budgetary position and to lower the stock of their government debt. Article 136 TFEU refers only to EAMS and tends "to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union". It is worth noting that even before the amendment of Article 136 TFEU 112 founding the financial assistance of the EU on "strict conditionality", the combination of Article 126(9) and 136 TFEU served for the basis of the conditionality of the financial assistance to Greece.
The conditionality of the European financial aid to Greece is based on the above mentioned decisions of the Council. The agreement of the EAMS for granting financial assistance to Greece is materialized only under conditionality, which is described in detail in the decisions of the Council for the financial assistance. The conditionality of the European financial assistance is consecutively laid down in the MoU. 113 The addressee of the Council Decision 2010/320/EU is Greece (Article 6) and it is bound to comply with the content of it (Article 288 TFEU). In the letter of intent on 3 May 2010 addressed by Greece to the designated European authorities, 114 It is however worth noting that any failure to fulfil this assertive expression is not subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court (Article 126(10) TFEU), but, according to Article 126(11) TFEU, to a specific system of remedies consisting, namely, of a non-interest-bearing deposit or severe fines. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty does not foresee any other sanctions against a recalcitrant EAMS failing to comply with its obligations deriving from the Council Decision based on Articles 126(9) and 136 TFEU and, in particular, it does not foresee the exclusion of the member state in question from the EMU. 116 It seems clear that the member states have intentionally opted for not providing for the exclusion of a member state from the Union as a sanction and they have left the resolution of problematic situations to be arranged politically. Moreover, if the exclusion from the Union in case of breach of one member's obligations is difficult to accept, it is even more difficult to accept the exclusion of a member state from the EMU, on grounds of the stability of the euro. Eventually, the withdrawal of one member state from the EMU could be conceivable only with its parallel withdrawal from the EU, according to Article 50 TEU. 117 The Council Decision 2010/320/EU, as amended, 118 is also the legal basis for the financial assistance to Greece, which was materialised through two Loan Facility Agreements. Both the Loan Facility Agreements are contracts and include the obligations of the parties. The Memoranda of Understanding, as revised, containing the conditionality of the Loan Facility Agreements constitute the contractual obligations that Greece should fulfil for ensuring the payment of the financial assistance, on the one hand, during the active phase of the Loan Facility Agreements, and on the other hand its repayment (non-active or posterior phase of the Loan Facility Agreements). Governing law for any issue arising out of or in connection with both the European financial assistance Agreements is the English law. 119 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is empowered to rule on any dispute concerning the legality, validity, interpretation or performance of the First Loan Facility Agreement, 120 whereas the Court of Luxembourg is exclusively competent to rule on any dispute concerning the Second Loan Facility Agreement. 121 The first Loan Facility to Greece was founded on two agreements. 122 First, on an Inter-Creditors Agreement among the lenders -i.e. all the EAMS except Slovakia, Ireland and Portugal 123 -laying down certain arrangements on their mutual relationship, notably the total amount of the loans, their respective contribution to the pool of loans and the procedure to authorize the disbursement of the different installments of the loans, to be agreed by unanimity of all the lenders after having determined that Greece has complied with the conditionality measures agreed. Second, on a Loan Facility Agreement (LFA) between the lender member states 124 and Greece containing the terms and conditions of the 80 billion Euro 125 pooled loans, notably the procedure for drawdown and net disbursement, the calculation of the interest rate, 126 costs and expenses (active phase of the LFA) and the repayments by the borrower (non-active or posterior phase of the LFA). The European Commission was not acting as a lender in the LFA but was entrusted by the EAMS with the coordination and administration of the pooled bilateral loans, including their disbursement to Greece. 127 The term of the LFA has originally been for five years (Article 3(3)(d) of the LFA). The LFA was amended in December 2012 for lowering the interest rate of the repayment and exceeding its term to thirty years.
The Second European financial assistance granted by the EFSF has been provided 128 under the form of loan disbursements. The Second European financial assistance was mainly 129 based on the Master financial assistance facility agreement (MFAFA) signed by Greece, the Bank of Greece, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (as guarantor) and the EFSF containing the terms and conditions of the up to 109.1 billion Euro loan facility (LF), notably the procedure for disbursement, the calculation of the interest rate, costs and expenses, 130 the events of default, the undertakings relating to inspections, fraud prevention and audits (active phase of the LF of the MFAFA) and the repayments by the borrower (non-active or posterior phase of the LF of the MFAFA). In order to ease Greece's debt burden and bring its debt back on a sustainable path, the MFAFA (along, as we have mentioned before, with the LFA) was amended in December 2012 by mainly 131 lowering the interest rate and extending the maturity of the loan. The average maturity of the financial assistance under the LF of the MFAFA, as amended, is 32.5 years (Article 2(d) of the Loan Facility Specific Terms of the MFAFA).
As long as Greece is under Articles 129(9) and 136(3) TFEU, and fulfils the conditionality set out in the each time updated Memorandum of Understanding, 132 the disbursement of the amounts of the financial assistance foreseen in the LFA and MFAFA is guaranteed. 133 In case that Greece does not comply with the conditionality of the Memorandum of Understanding, as each time updated, it risks the non-disbursement of funds under the above facilities, during their active phase and also the extension of the term of the Second Economic Adjustment Programme after the end of February 2015 134 to ensure the implementation of the lacking conditionality. 135 The non-compliance to the conditionality does -however -not constitute an event of default allowing the declaration of the whole debt of Greece (i.e. the whole amount of any or all financial assistance made and outstanding under the LFA and MFAFA together with accrued interest and all other amounts due in respect thereof) to be immediately due and payable. An event of default consists only, inter alia, in the nonapplication of the funds of the European (as well as the IMF) financial assistance according to the terms of the LFA and MFAFA and the MoU, 136 and the termination of the IMF Arrangement with Greece. 137 The conditionality of the Memorandum of Understanding, as each time updated, is drastic only during the active phase of the LFA and the LF of the MFAFA. After the non-active phase of the above mentioned Agreements, Greece will be under post-programme surveillance as long as a minimum of 75 % of the above mentioned European financial assistance remains to be paid. 138 The post-programme economic and budgetary surveillance over Greece will namely aim at the avoidance of any circumvention of the measures that have been implemented under the Memorandum of Understanding, as each time reviewed, supported by the LFA and the LF of the MFAFA.
D. Conclusions
Each European and international financial assistance to Greece in 2010 and 2012 was granted under conditionality contained in the respective Memorandum of Understanding. The legal nature of the Memoranda of Understanding with IMF on one side and on the other side with the EAMS/EFSF, conditioning the disbursement of the financial assistance to Greece, depends on the form and the legal basis of the Facility in respect. The financial facilities of the IMF granted by Arrangements do not give any legal claim to disbursement to the receiving state. The respect of the conditionality set out in the Memorandum of Understanding, under which the financial assistance in the form of an Arrangement was granted, is secured by the unilateral payment by the Fund. If Greece decides not to comply with the conditionality of the IMF Arrangement, the consequences resulting from its decision will primarily be the release of IMF of its unilateral commitment. Secondly, Greece may also face the risk of being declared ineligible for using the General Resources of the Fund.
The Memoranda of Understanding containing the conditionality of the European financial assistance agreements with Greece are binding Greece, because they are based on a Council Decision. In case that Greece is not complying with the conditionality of the financial assistance Agreements, it does not receive, during the active phase of the financial facility agreement, any next disbursement of the instalments of the financial assistance. But its decision not to comply with the conditionality of the updated Memorandum of Understanding constitutes neither an event of default nor is it conclusive for the exclusion of Greece from the EMU or the EU.
It remains to be seen whether the extraordinary international financial assistance provided under the analysed legal consequences will bring the promised fruits, namely bringing back to the track the Greek economy by helping for the modernization of the Greek state.
